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More than fifteen years after the beginning of the so-called post-communist period in East 
Central Europe specific problems of the multidimensional changes are discussed with 
increasing frankness. The importance of topics such as conflicting interests and different 
identities continues to grow.  This is the case in both Germany and the European Union (EU) – 
both frames for the integration of their Eastern and Western parts 
 
In both cases we can find a basic structure of centre and periphery, which partly reproduces 
itself on different levels. In a traditional sense, the West plays the part of the centre while the 
East represents the periphery.  This study focuses on the latter. Centre-periphery structures 
symbolize differences, such as quantitative and qualitative asymmetry. If relations are 
perceived as correlating systematically with asymmetrical structures, feelings of discontent 
and reactions of protest and resistance may be favoured in peripheries.  Specific forms of 
identity are then likely to become more characteristic than others.  The internal functions and 
external consequences – especially for the entire system, which includes all parts of the 
structure – shall be analysed.   
 
My approach is based on the differentiation between the `specific´ and `diffuse´ support for 
political systems according to Easton (1965).  Common features of integration processes 
within Germany on the one hand, and Europe on the other hand, as well as differences 
between them will be illustrated.  A detailed elaboration of the German-German integration 
serves as a contrast for the situation of the East Central European Countries within the EU.  
The analysis of the European process focuses on Poland by way of example.  The conclusion 
concentrates on the importance of the different types of support in the context of collective 
identity-construction concerning the chosen cases as well as hierarchic structures in general. 
 
  
1. Theoretical background 
 
Easton (1965) argues that while specific support for a system is based on a concrete 
satisfactory output – of a political kind which can materialise economically – diffuse support is 
independent of outputs.1  It can be rooted in generally shared interests, loyalty, solidarity and 
legitimacy, is an approval of the system in itself and shows analogies to the concept of 
identity.  In this context, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that in German-
German relations as well as in the European East-Western relations we do not only find a 
whole system (`Germany´ or `European Union´), but many subsystems too.2  
 
Easton´s approach can be applied if an inter-societal, rather than an intra-societal, situation 
within a shared system is assumed.3  However, modifying this theory has a condition: both 
partners, the stronger and the weaker one4, have to be clearly interested in integration so that 
a certain common and simultaneously superordinated systemic constraint exists. In both 
cases this can be assumed as given. 
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As aspects of identity are focused; this text mainly refers to diffuse support. One important 
supposition is: the greater diffuse support for a system, the lower its dependence on specific 
support and vice versa. If the system as a whole has a relevant advance of trust at its disposal, 
the political output of the stronger partner or the material help respectively may be, at least 
for some time, lower, compared to its dimensions in a situation with hardly any or even no 
diffuse support. However, it has to be assumed that diffuse support cannot be stable in a long 
term perspective if specific support was not perceived as sufficient. In other words, if interests 
are not satisfied to a certain degree, it is possible that the belief in the legitimacy of a situation 
or relation will decrease.  This can withdraw the basis of loyalty and solidarity. But it is not 
imperative that the interests are of a material kind, rather perceptions of status are focused.5  
 
 
2. The Unification Processes ‘East’ – ‘West’ Germany and ‘East Central Europe’ – 
‘European Union’: Similarities and Differences  
 
At their beginning, both unification processes were based on relatively widespread diffuse 
support.6 This was substantiated by elements of collective identity7. In the case of Germany 
there existed a very widespread traditional idea of unity, which can take different shapes, 
depending on generation especially, and in the European context a conscience of belonging 
together in principle can also be found.  The two cases are most comparable on a structural 
level. Differences can be analysed with the help of the specific ways in which the Eastern and 
Western parts approach each other. These concern speed, geographic location and size. 
  
European unification is certainly more extensive and complex because of relatively highly 
differing degrees of development. From a West European perspective the geographic space, 
that is `entitled´ to experience loyalty, is relatively harder to define. This is one of the reasons 
why the European perception of unity was far more asymmetric than in the German-German 
example (see footnote 6). However, in both cases the citizens of the Eastern regions felt a 
stronger tie with the West than the other way round. In addition to this pull-factor, the 
European example shows the important push-factor of an aimed demarcation towards 
Russia.8 
 
The question of German reunification found a fast positive answer, albeit without leaving 
much room for discussion. Correspondingly, the speed of equipping East Germany 
institutionally and infrastructurally was high and a shared identity seemed to be rather self-
evident. This was favoured by the assumption that cum grano salis regional identity is less 
suitable for instrumentalising a scheme of ‘friend and enemy’ as national identity, mainly 
because of the lower number of options for distinction (Bergem 1999: 199). Altogether, the 
starting-conditions of the German case may be called relatively favourable. 
  
After the initial euphoria, both Eastern regions soon experienced disappointment and 
disillusion9. Disappointed expectations became externalized which meant that deficits of the 
transformation processes were often not ascribed to the failure of state-socialism but to the 
partner of unification (Woderich 2000: 104). This is reinforced by persisting differences 
between East and West, which are often perceived, as directed `from above´. Additionally, 
these differences, may they be the unequal payment in East and West Germany10, the interim 
regulations for free exchange of persons from East Central to Western Europe11 or the 
argument about subventions in the field of agriculture12 are felt by a large proportion of the 
population. 
 
Forms of identity which develop are also increasingly directed against the perceived 
dominant partner. Dysfunctional consequences for the system as a whole are then inevitable. 
However, the course of transformation makes these identity-types seemingly unavoidable 
because the formal inclusion into the new institutional system makes the exclusion of culture 
and way of life rather probable. This results in feelings of being a second class-citizen or 
stranger in one’s own country (Woderich 1996: 87f.). But these identities are not a direct 
reproduction of old patterns. Rather, they are new forms of specific self-view which combine 
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 forms of praxis which people already are accustomed to with current experiences and future 
prospects (Woderich 1996: 96).  This has specific consequences for each system as a whole.  
 
 
3. The German Unification  
 
As has been mentioned already, in general, the starting conditions of the German unification 
were more favourable. This refers to a stronger and, at least in the beginning, a far more 
symmetrical feeling shared unity and identity. However, on closer inspection it is possible to 
detect that the feeling of belonging together, loyalty or solidarity has partly given way to 
rather pessimistic attitudes13. A majority of East Germans do not perceive themselves as 
treated equally, thus regionally different identities gain importance14.  
 
 
3.1  From euphoria to disillusion 
 
In East Germany the situation developed as follows: after a euphoric phase, which was 
characterized by a considerable lead of diffuse support, it soon became obvious that bringing 
the systems into line with each other economically would prove difficult – at least in the short 
to medium term. The actual problematic structural conditions of East Germany appeared to 
fade into the background while the West was increasingly blamed for providing insufficient 
support and responsible for the difficult economic situation in the East. This perception of the 
Western output favoured the development of low, specific support on the part of the East. At 
the same time, a specific interpretation emerged that suggested that the West had no 
sufficient feeling or understanding of solidarity; in other words, it did not invest enough 
diffuse support in the common project. Therefore the basis of diffuse solidarity of the East was 
reduced. 
  
At the beginning, this process was primarily about economic issues. The perception of a poor 
and inadequate political integration completes this picture. For the individual, this is 
expressed as a feeling of being ‘absorbed’ or ‘annexed’, as being inferior in a one-sided 
process of assimilation, because important political questions are decided ‘elsewhere’.15  The 
existing feeling of strangeness towards the (Western) political system is grounded in the fact 
that the East Germans fought successfully to take over the democratic institutions but, 
however, did not ascribe the practical process of institutional transfer to themselves 
(Woderich 2000: 106). It appeared to be an application of external institutions and their 
`players´. This, combined with the impression of a ‘simulated’ rather than actually practiced 
democracy, favoured a loss of diffuse support16. As many East Germans viewed their (political) 
interests as being unconsidered, they then appeared to question the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole, which also diminished feelings of loyalty and solidarity. 
 
In light of this, the multidimensional structure of centre and periphery which is related to 
economic as well as to political interests, became identity-effective. This emphasises how 
sensitive the relation between diffuse and specific support is. Therefore, both ideal-types can 
only be separated analytically, because in reality they are not independent of each other. 
Instead, they stand in a relation of exchange, especially concerning aspects of status. 
 
 
3.2  The development of an Eastern ‘counter-identity’ 
 
There have been attempts to reinterpret this perceived multidimensional inferiority. These 
include a symbolic reference to objects, codes and signs that can create a sense of 
connection, and relate to a shared world and its specific history, as well as to generate an 
exclusive knowledge of the (East German) minority, thus  converting the structural inferiority 
into a virtual superiority (Woderich 2000: 109). This is expressed for example by preferences 
which have exclusive meanings. Discourses about assimilation to West German forms 
supported a consciousness and an emphasis of East German markers as a counter-identity 
(Bafoil 1995: 5). 
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The consciousness of an East-identity emerged in many and diverse forms. This has also an 
exclusive dimension because of its characteristic particularism: a demarcation from Western 
Germany which might have problematic consequences for the joint project `Germany today´ 
and its important functions and expectations on both sides17. ‘Obstinate formations of 
identity’18 therefore try to restabilise specific traditions as a typical reaction to radical systemic 
discontinuities – largely independent of their democratic legitimation (Woderich 2000: 112). 
 
Reactions of the West include attempts to understand, but also helplessness, a simple lack of 
interest and a refusal to accept responsibility for problematic aspects of the integration 
process. At least indirectly, the East is reproached with a lack of its own initiative and its 
incapability of effectively handling the means at its disposal. Primarily, this is about financial 
help that has been and continues to be transferred from West to East Germany19.  
 
The West is significantly less conscious of political asymmetries. This is not so surprising 
because, structurally, it is the stronger part. Widespread reactions can only be observed in the 
context of electoral successes of the socialists (former communists) in the East. In general, the 
West also developed a regional self-concept which distinguishes itself from the so-called 
‘Ossi’, though this obviously has passed its zenith already20. Thus, an asymmetry exists on the 
level of identity: the West does not need the East for positioning itself; rather it is the other 
way round21.  
 
 
3.3   Structures of identity in today’s Germany 
 
As the structure of centre and periphery can be perceived as relevant to both East and West 
Germany and runs along several levels, it is difficult to fully comprehend. For example, when 
cleavages are fixed on the level of identity, then the situation has the potential to influence 
society as a whole. Stabilization of elements of identity with a mainly exclusive character 
might, however, be problematic for shared systems. 
  
This situation includes the risk of switching from the level of politically negotiable interest-
discourses to their ‘culturalization’. Individual opinions then become an expression of a 
cultural character with a tendency of being deeply rooted and hardly changeable (Bergem 
1999: 200). Consequently, the policies are thrust into the background because of their 
supposed ineffectiveness. 
  
This risk grows if specific East-German experiences are not considered in public discourses 
and, therefore, the specific ways of understanding and life-achievements are not recognized 
(Woderich 1996: 96). The longer this problematic situation lasts, the stronger the wish and the 
need of articulation of `East-German problems´ becomes. 
 
 
4. The process of unification between ‘East Central Europe’ and the ‘European Union’  
 
There are several reasons for choosing the relations between the European Union and Poland 
as an example of integration between West and East Central European countries. Firstly, 
aspects of the typical regional course of history have developed especially clear contours in 
Poland. Historical consciousness is still exceptionally strong there (from a Western, and 
especially from a German perspective). In addition, the current conflicts between Poland and 
the EU manifest themselves with particular distinctiveness to the key debates of this article. 
 
I begin with a glance at Polish-European history which provides the basis for the Polish 
attachment to (Western) Europe and therefore forms the background to the advanced diffuse 
support for the shared institutional system of the `European Union´. 
 
 
4.1     ‘Poland and Europe’: a historical relationship 
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 The sense of belonging to (Western) Europe has genuine religious roots: “In the beginning of 
the ‘Europeanisation’ of Poland stands the adoption of Christianity from Rome in the year 
996” (Krasnodebski 1999: 77, translated quotation). Poland’s position as a ‘religious border’ 
manifested itself historically as antemurale christianitatis and traditionally plays a particular 
role in understanding the nation.  In Poland a close relationship between Catholic faith and 
national distinction from ‘the outside’, mainly the non-Catholic ‘barbarism’, symbolized by 
Russia, existed. At the same time, religion played a functional role by orientating identity 
towards Western Europe. Hence, it was an important aspect of an open-mindedness 
concerning the values and way of life of Western Europe at that time and supported their 
adoption in Poland. Even today, Christianity has an important meaning as a criterion for 
cultural-geographical demarcation and as a spring for shared values from an East Central 
European and especially from a Polish perspective (Klunkert 1996: 234). 
 
This leads to a second relevant traditional line of identity construction involving the analysis 
of historical developments, namely, the liberal elements of self-understanding, as well as 
related forms of collective identity.  Historically, the roots of this line of tradition in Poland 
reach back to the ‘Republic of Nobility’ in the 16th century. At that time, an early 
democratisation of the state took place (Stölting 1995: 159f).  The Polish situation in those 
days was characterised by the social power in the hands of the nobility that made decisions 
through an early kind of parliament.  This period has since been known as the golden freedom.  
This is the background for the employment of the term ‘Pole’ in a political sense especially in 
the 17th century (Krasnodebski 1999: 93).  Additionally, these ideologies became concrete in 
the first written constitution of modern Europe that was passed by the Polish Imperial Diet on 
May 3rd 1791.22  
 
At that time, thanks to the fundamental influence of the French Revolution, nationalism was 
used to support the creation of politcial entities, in the form of the nation-state.  Throughout 
18th and 19th century Europe, nationalism was classified as an ideology of liberation in a 
selective and inclusive sense. ‘Europe’ and ‘civil freedom’ became weighty slogans.  A 
connection of the national ethos with internationalist and generally humanistic ideals 
characterised Poland at the beginning of the 19th  Century.23 
 
Europe had a particular position when actions in the context of conflicts were interpreted not 
only in the name of national particularism, but also for the `freedom of Europe´. The idea of 
the democratic constitutional state and the general acceptance of human rights were the 
most striking features of the historic images of Europe (Klunkert 1996: 235). The political and 
inclusive character of the corresponding collective identity with its emphasis on the individual 
(vs. the collective) favoured a kind of liberal patriotism instead of exclusive nationalism. 
 
Paradoxically, at the same time a national mythologisation of history took place.24  This means, 
that the liberal element also offered a possibility for identifying cultural – and collective – 
aspects of national identity as natural ones. The reciprocal chance of connecting the 
analytically antithetical categories in this way offers the theoretical basis for the 
amalgamation of the different identity elements. Although it is questionable about whether it 
is appropriate to speak of a fracture on the depicted background of the numerous possible 
connections and real combinations, this is essentially what happened, with an historical 
fracture taking place extending once more the multidimensionality of collective identity in 
Poland. After the primarily liberal political nationalism the tables had turned again.  
 
The divisions of Poland in 1772, 1791 and 1795 played a decisive role in this process.25  After 
the last division the Poles lost the right to exist as a state. On the basis of the long-standing 
situation of foreign rule in combination with a weak bourgeoisie, the exclusive national 
element became accentuated at cost of liberal elements. Correspondingly, the former central 
reference point of national unity – civic rights and liberal freedom – underwent a substantial 
transformation: romantic ideas of ‘common blood’, ‘common descent’ and shared language 
resulted in the development of an exclusive nationalism (Weiss/Reinprecht 1998: 29).  This 
was a turning-point, which shifted the importance of national identity from humanism to an 
exclusive perspective.26 
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Like most of the post-communist states Poland was not able to return to real experiences of 
democracy. This was also true for the interwar period: “The so-called democratic experiments 
of the interwar period lasted less than a decade and are best understood, in any case, as 
authoritarian politics in democratic guise” (Bunce 1995: 89)27. During this time, the traditional 
line of identity construction against the East, and primarily in opposition to Russia, was 
revived. Again, the concept of Poland as an outpost of Europe dominated. This time, the 
demarcation was less religious and more political – although it certainly followed the same 
borderlines. The Polish border to the East was considered as being identical with the 
imagined border of a European identity (Holzer 1996: 88). 
      
The Second World War affected Poland in a particularly hard way. The population found itself 
again under foreign rule, this time by the German Nazis. Not surprisingly, an exclusive national 
identity was typical for the Polish population until the end of the Second World War. 
 
Poland didn’t become a sovereign state after 1945. The communist system was perceived to 
be forced upon the Polish people and as extraneous to the ‘Polish nature’: “From a traditional 
Polish point of view, bolshevism was a product of a civilising crisis and an extreme expression 
of authoritarian tendencies within the Russian culture. Therefore it sometimes has been even 
regarded as `asiatic barbarism´” (Krasnodebski 1999: 74, translated quotation). 
 
Although a `selectively excluding nationalism´ was tolerated from ‘above’ after 1945, this did 
not help to establish a real identification between the Polish people and their rulers, because 
exclusion was mostly aimed at the non-socialist West. The new rulers understood that a 
limited synthesis of communism and exclusive nationalism was politically expedient, thus 
rendering it possible to appear as guardians of the historical interests of the nation (Fischer-
Galati 1994: 34). In doing so, traditional nationalist concepts were revived, such as “the 
superiority of a mono-national state over a multinational one and the conviction that the 
state consisted of a ‘racially pure’ Polish population” (Holzer 1991: 400, translated quotation). 
Furthermore, anti-German emotions as well as a ‘tactical anti-Semitism’ were 
instrumentalised, while Russia and the Russians, who traditionally have been a target of 
exclusive nationalistic resentments from the Polish side, served as a ‘natural reserve’ (Holzer 
1991: 400). This concept obviously came into conflict with the traditional lines of identity 
construction, and therefore did not really support identification with the situation and the 
system. However, a partial success of this strategy could have been observed. 
  
At the same time, another ideology developed, which can be considered a counterpart: a 
mythological and ‘complete’ structure of a moralistic image of the society (Tatur 1994: 28). In 
this sense, ‘European identity’, mainly as a ‘Central European identity’, gained more attention, 
especially in the 1980s. 
 
Historically the relation to Western Europe is typically linked with a specific mysticism. This 
emphasises religious ideology, as well as the one of enlightenment and favours the idea of a 
quasi-natural feeling of unity which forms a basis of diffuse support.  
 
 
4.2       Images of Europe and of the European Union in Poland after 1989 
 
The images of Europe and the EU are closely linked. Immediately after 1989 the perception of 
the two as one concept was very common. Today the distinction between European identity 
and support for European integration within the EU framework is more clear-cut.   
 
 
4.2.1    Radical Change and Euphoria 
 
While ‘Europe’ symbolises a shared culture, the EU represents its contemporary institutional 
composition. In principle, ‘Europe’ for the East Central European side functions largely as a 
‘moral justification’ for the right to participate in the EU. During and shortly after the upheaval 
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 of 1989, this differentiation between the two terms was not that distinct. On the contrary, the 
EU was perceived as heir of an old, positively revitalised Polish ‘European identity’ and 
therefore was able to set an ‘advance of trust’. 
  
The EU has been seen as the (then) present-day shape of Europe. In this sense, it had 
substantial symbolic value: “The EU has been an important external anchor to the 
consolidation of democracy since a civic, democratic ethos has been inherently linked to 
European identity” (Villa Faber Group 2001: 37). 
 
Alongside economic and political interests, a traditional element of identity was also highly 
significant. Although the interests in the foreground were mostly of material kind, the 
expectation, or better, the pretence that Western Europe should come up to these interests 
was mainly based on the symbolic level of the historical and cultural self-understanding of the 
post-socialist countries of East Central Europe. Part of this was, and still is, based on the claim 
of historical and cultural `belonging´ to Europe, which “had been violently interrupted for 40 
years” (Srubar 1995: 679, translated quotation). 
 
The deep roots of European identity were indicated by the self-denotation as (being part of) 
‘Central Europe’ and by the claim of ‘returning to Europe’. These sentiments were frequently 
expressed during this phase in Poland and emphasised the wish to become a member of the 
EU. At the beginning of the collapse of the real-socialist regime, unrealistic concepts and 
images of Europe were widespread. They were additionally pushed by a feeling of threat as a 
neighbour of Russia. At this time, a psychological repression concerning the past of real-
socialism also began. But as the political reality in Europe had changed substantially, the 
‘frozen’ pre-war images of Europe could not be applied anymore (Klunkert 1996: 236). 
 
Holzer (1996: 91) states that the image of Europe in Poland during the first half of the 1990’s 
was mainly determined by economic factors, especially because most of the knowledge was 
obtained through satellite-television; impressions and pictures of prosperity were perceived 
as European characteristics. The term ‘Europeanization’ for a majority symbolised the rise of 
the living-standards, high wages, quality of life, cleanness and order as well as a high level of 
technology and work organisation (Holzer 1996:  97).  
 
For more educated parts of Polish society, the cultural factor – an ‘old European culture’ was, 
and is, assumed to be more important. These political and intellectual circles interpreted 
‘Europeanization’ as the process of economic integration into the EU on the one hand and the 
“development of shared European norms of political and civil life (political democracy, human 
rights, self-administration, rule of law) on the other” (Holzer 1996: 97, translated quotation).  
The more unrealistic and especially unbalanced the images, expectations and hopes were, the 
more inevitable have been disappointments.     
 
 
4.2.2    Changing images of Europe and the European Union 
  
As the misperception of the new situation became obvious, the interpretation of the 
interconnection between ‘Europe’ and ‘European Union’ began to unravel.  European identity 
was more and more understood as not necessarily connected with personal support for EU 
integration. 
 
The first implementation of new institutions to foster European integration, along with 
underlying values, was based on a widespread and diffuse support (Easton 1965). This 
support lost ground when the economic and the political output of the new common system 
(the EU) fell far below the expectations and was interpreted as inadequate support of ‘the 
other side’. `Insufficient’ output withdrew the basis from potentially ongoing diffuse support. 
This manifested the differentiation between a ‘cultural Europe’ and an ‘economic EU’. 
 
In the economic field, disillusionment was representative of disappointed consumer 
expectations as well as psychological stress related to issues such as personal job insecurity. 
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This mainly concerned workers and employees of state-owned enterprises, a large number of 
smallholders and pensioners. At the political level, the country saw itself confronted with 
problematic home affairs such as corruption and the need to overcome the political crimes of 
the communist period.  
 
This preparation process from the side of the new members in East Central Europe meanwhile 
was considered largely as a unilateral adaptation to the Western European rules. The 
asymmetrical structure of the access negotiations turned out to be more and more 
problematic. The East Central Europeans expected equal negotiation in principle, but instead 
had to accept that their level of access is granted by the West. Critics became louder when the 
negotiations were perceived as intergovernmental and ‘our’ (i.e. ‘Polish’) national interest had 
to be defended against the national interests of the incumbent EU member states (Villa Faber 
Group 2001: 1).  Two examples illustrate these problems: the negotiation of the constitutional 
convent and agricultural policy. 
 
Although the new member state countries are directly affected by the results of the 
discussion about the future shape of the EU, during negotiations they were present as 
observers only. Being reduced to this status, however, was a source of ongoing 
disappointment that was easily connected to the already existing scepticism concerning the 
process of accession. Because of the impression that the EU doesn’t attribute adequate 
meaning to their positions, there was a significant risk that the East Central Europeans would 
lose interest in the future of the EU (Villa Faber Group 2001: 50) or that they would feel 
provoked and try to enforce their specific national positions. 
 
The agricultural policy is especially problematic with regard to the East Central European 
countries.28 Poland still has a large number of smallholders. On the one hand this means that if 
the EU would treat the Western and the Eastern peasants equally, it would create immense 
costs for the Union and additionally confuse the entire income relation. On the other hand, 
the now decided rejection of equal treatment and the decision to adopt transitional 
regulations for years, affects huge parts of the population. The political weight of smallholders 
in Polish society is big enough to provoke crises and shifts in public opinion29. At the same 
time, there is a growing impression of being politically and economically powerless within the 
‘common system’, particularly among political circles in Poland.  These circles already 
anticipate that Poland may play only a secondary role in the process of European integration 
(Holzer 1996: 101).  The wider population also feels powerless face to face with the EU.30  
Klunkert (1996: 238) writes: “This self-observation as being ‘Europe’s edge’ stands in crass 
opposition to the self-perception as ‘Europe’s centre’, as the historical images of Europe 
suggest the position of the own culture”. 
 
Summing up, it can be said that the perception of the EU as non-transparent, undemocratic 
and therefore illegitimate, increases.  The relative turning off from Western Europe intensified 
when Russia, as a significant push-factor, lost importance as security interests decreased 
because of the accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
 
This opened the way from euphoria and the development of trust to scepticism. 
Consequently, it became more and more difficult for governing elites to handle the 
divergence between meeting the requirements of the Union and convincing their population 
of the necessity and value of the concessions – and possibly ensuring it morally through a 
‘European community of values’31. 
 
 
4.2.3 Poland after the EU Accession Referendum 
 
Poland is the biggest country of the East Central European region. Today it is characterized by 
huge agricultural and obsolete industrial sectors which pose serious problems to the 
necessary processes of structural modernization. This situation is the basis of widespread calls 
for welfare payments and `careful´ restructuring. Attitudes towards the European Union are 
quite mixed. Until a few weeks before the referendum took place on 7-8 June 2003, large parts 
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 of the population were sceptic and perceived European integration as a dominating menace. 
The committee responsible for the referendum campaign feared a defeat with incalculable 
societal consequences and, therefore, reacted to these conditions by appealing to a European 
consciousness.  This meant that they used an emotional and direct identity related argument. 
For this purpose, Poland typically was called not only `part of Europe´ but `being Europe´. 
  
This strategy was successful: more than 50% participated in the voting and more than 80% 
voted `yes´. However, enormous expectations were raised leading to the view that a much 
better future will follow the accession to the European Union. This combination is not without 
risks. It links identity-aspects relatively closely with a combination of immaterial and material 
elements, united in the expectation of a better future. Now, the strategy of the campaign 
committee is to say, “Yes, our situation will improve in an integrated European Union, if we 
work hard on it”. The open question is, ‘has this been achieved in time or is a new wave of 
disappointment is already on its way?’  
 
 
4.2.4    Steps of Development Towards an Antagonism Between `EU´ and `Nation´  
 
If support for a ‘common Europe’ in Poland should decrease further, antagonisms between 
‘Europe’ and ‘the Polish nation’ will grow. Indeed, this can already be observed.  This 
development is related to the traditional East Central European understanding of ‘nation’. As 
previously shown, after long periods of foreign rule, the nation is interpreted as the essence of 
the collective self, including the wish for significant independence as a political subject. If 
political output is sensed as unsatisfactory due to minimal autonomy and participation, it 
leads to refusal of an ‘EU-hegemony’. Concerning Europe-related aspects of identity, this 
means that “the more frequently conflicts concerning objectives occur between the European 
and the national level, the higher the probability of an European identity loosing 
attractiveness” (Lilli 1998: 154, translated quotation)32. In fact, the situation of the still relatively 
young political sovereignty becomes particularly precarious within the described forms and 
hierarchic structure of centre and periphery33.   
 
Positive and negative experiences of Europe and related images and identity attitudes are 
certainly not distributed equally among the population. Internal conflicts grow as cleavages 
between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ harden.  Analogous to social groups, the political parties 
polarise increasingly along the topic of ‘accession to the Union’34. And here the judgements 
about a ‘Europeanisation’ of Poland vary. One group of politicians, intellectuals and publicists 
of the right wing put the so-called ‘European cosmopolitanism’ in opposition to a ‘true’ Polish 
national consciousness, other representatives of the political and intellectual spectrum try to 
underline the binding of the Polish national consciousness to the idea of Europe (Holzer 1996: 
97). 
 
Hence, the cleavage that divides the Polish society did not only develop along the line of 
‘elites versus masses’, although some correlation with the degree of education certainly exists. 
The topic won increasingly public interest and importance as the date of accession 
approached. Correspondingly the tone of discussion became sharper. This was especially the 
case in Poland35: “‘We are not going to Brussels begging on our knees’ expressed Ryszard 
Czarnecki, the chairman of the state-committee for European integration of that time, before 
the negotiations for accessing were opened officially in the end of March 1998. And the chief-
negotiator, Jan Kolakowski, underlined that Poland will not allow to be pushed into the role of 
the poor cousin” (Juchler 1999: 486, translated quotation).36 
 
Yet the motivations for, refusing the EU are diverse. Nationally oriented persons “originate 
either from right-wing circles (among them also national-conservative groups of Polish 
Catholicism), where above all the dangers for the Polish culture are underlined, or from left-
wing circles, who appeal to the dangers for the Polish economy” (Holzer 1996: 97, translated 
quotation).  
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Discussions about the creation of a supranational ‘State of Europe’ usually provoke negative 
reactions. An extreme right-wing view – that is possibly not able to win majorities in this form, 
but comes close to the core of general worries – is that no new restrictions on Polish 
sovereignty should be allowed. For this reason, it considered accession to the EU as being out 
of question. Such positions frequently constructed a remarkable equalisation of European 
Union and communism and named both as ‘people’s prisons’ (Strobel 2001: 266f.).37  
 
Strobel (2001: 277, translated quotation) assumes that “the rightist changed fundamentally 
the initially positive attitude of the society regarding the EU and the opening towards the 
West”. Although it is not possible to quantify this influence, it certainly goes beyond being 
marginal to a considerable degree (see Strobel 2001: 280). This is also reflected by the results 
of public opinion polls regarding the accession to the European Union. While in 1996 79% of 
the representative random sample supported accession to the EU, in November 2001 it was 
only 49%. In 1996, 7% were explicitly against the accession, while in November 2001 this share 
was more than 30% (Mildenberger 2002: 3).38 
 
The represented attitudes and ideas offer a basis for a nationally inspired counter-identity that 
causes problems for the ‘project united Europe’ particularly when it instrumentalises an 
antagonism between the nation and the EU.  The spectrum of opinions is broad and highly 
diversified. But certain structures and ways of acting risk the consolidation of problems which 
can become more complicated as long as they are neither understood nor solved.  
 
 
4.2.5     Attempts of Compensation on the Basis of Alternative Identity-aspects  
 
For the self image of a group it is of crucial importance to be more successful than others, 
when it comes to shared social values. If this is not the case, other dimensions of values can 
experience a revaluation in order to re-establish a balance.  In Europe, certain economic 
values for example are generally highly estimated and often correlate with the distribution of 
political power (Lilli 1998: 144).  
 
In the Polish case this is expressed through the question ‘does the country risk its own identity 
by `returning to Europe´?’ (Bingen 1992: 62). If Europe is equated with relativism, atheism, 
drugs, pornography, abortion, divorce, homosexuality – in a word, Babylon, Sodom and 
Gomorrha altogether (Michnik 1993; Buchowski 1997: 34f.) the conclusion can be drawn that 
states that Poland is `the real Europe´ and that `returning to Europe´ is the task of Western 
Europe and its deteriorated morals (Bingen 1992: 74). Partly, the idea of a Polish mission – 
which is well known from the historic images of the Polish nation and its relation to Europe – 
is taken up and centres around the idea of morally influencing and healing the sick Europe 





On one side it is possible agree to Holzer, who assumes that the Polish fears and hopes are 
more or less comparable to the ones of the old member states. However, he modifies that for 
Poland, an insecurity about its role and the related positions within the EU context, remain 
specific (Holzer 1996: 103f.).  It is obviously not enough to restrict relations within the 
European Union to the acceptance of formal aspects and rules, particularly if the process of 
European integration should not lose its basis because of inadequate specific and diffuse 
support. However, the structure which on several levels is perceived as being systematically 
asymmetrical and interpreted as hierarchical means a risk for the common project. Although 
interests in this project are undeniable on both sides, the potential consequences of the 
described difficulties are serious, even more as there are already close interdependencies 
between Western and East Central Europe.  
 
Despite the complex structure of relations, how can the multidimensional national identities 
on the European level or regional identities on a German level favour a shared foundation of 
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 new types of collective identities?  The following arguments shall help answering this 
question.  First of all, the connection of diffuse and specific support has to be considered. It 
seems that in the long run diffuse support cannot remain stable without specific support. This 
means, that an output increase – on the side of the West in Germany as well as in Europe – 
could contribute to avoiding the successful stabilisation of particular and exclusive identities. 
This is probably most realistic in fields of shared interests. But it has to be kept in mind that 
such decisions mainly depend on definitions and interpretations. 
  
Two aspects have to be differentiated: while on an economic level a growing material and 
interests-related output probably would be assessed positively by the weaker partner, 
politically shared decisions made by equal partners would need to be more extensive. Partly, 
these two aspects stand in a substitutive relation and with both the West can express loyalty 
and solidarity. 
 
In the long run the importance of power and policy related questions grow, because it implies 
the problem of national sovereignty, which is especially precarious for East Central Europe. 
Only in this way can positions be met which demand either complete sovereignty of the 
nation or an equal position within the all European context (Holzer 1996: 101). To a lower 
degree but structurally comparable, people in East Germany are concerned about possibilities 
of political influence. In both cases, in order to support structural change it is necessary that 
the same rules become valid for all players as soon as possible.   
 
Only on these grounds can the image of a legitimate relationship be set up or stabilized 
respectively. This has to allow independent acting according to the special conditions and 
logics of life in a periphery (Woderich 1996: 96) because it is highly improbable that the 
economic asymmetry will be overcome within the foreseeable future. 
   
For establishing legitimacy, loyalty and solidarity in both cases a common framework of 
values, norms and mutual understanding is necessary. The simple logic of a quid pro quo 
exchange is not enough (Bertelsmann Foundation 2001: 37). This would favour European 
identities which were less dependent on economic trends and would, also correspond with 
the explained East Central European type of identification structure. In this sense two aspects 
are of crucial importance: firstly, the idea of a nameable, distinguishable community with so-
called `pre-political´ and past-related elements is necessary as well as, secondly, political and 
mainly future-oriented aspects.  
 
In this context, neither a homogenised `EU-society´, nor a German equivalent with a uniform 
and `obligatory´ collective European identity, can be perceived as ideal. Rather, a common 
political and socio-economic space of communication would have to be established. Its basis 
has to be sufficiently stable to avoid settlements of conflicts. In this way, the developing 
communicative space could become the basis of a community of interpretation, which, again, 
could be functional for the development of new forms of identity (Gephart 1999: 167). 
 
Coming to these decisions it is necessary to make both sides aware of the importance of their 
respective common project and of possible consequences – especially, because of already 
very far-reaching interdependencies. This, again, concerns the level of `concrete´ interests. If, 
however, the East European countries remain within the described multidimensional 
periphery, considerations of the known structural problems and second-rate `solutions´ will 
continue. In addition, it has to be taken into account that the development of nationalism can 
be influenced considerably by the logics of relations between centre and periphery (Jacyno 
1994: 66). This does not only mean that shaping a common space becomes more and more 
difficult, but that substantial parts of responsibility for this development will have to be taken 
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1 A more detailed discussion of the two terms and potential additional categories can be 
found in Westle 1999. 
2 In the German case these are the regions East- and West-Germany and European case the 
different new and old member states.  
3 The decision for this level of analysis is decisive. Easton´s understanding obviously includes 
this interpretation: „The members of a political system who are participating in a common 
political community may well have different cultures and traditions or they may be entirely 
separate nationalities“ (Easton 1965: 177).   
4 Such general differentiations have the advantage to abstract from concrete contents. 
Therefore, several aspects can be subsumed which might base on perception mainly.   
5 This is also a differentiation from Offe, who developed the idea of a `dilemma of simultaneity 
(Offe 1991). 
6 In 1989 75% (83%) of citizens of the European Community agreed to the statement that 
Poland and Hungary shall receive support of the Community for the development of 
economic cooperation, 74% plead for a membership of the East Central European countries 
when democracy has been installed (Commission of the European Communities 1989). On 
the other hand, in 1990 98% of the East Central Europeans agreed with the idea of joining the 
EC within 10 years (Commission of the European Communities 1990b). In the German-German 
case in spring 1990 a unification found support of nearly 80% of the FRG-citizens and of 90% 
of the GDR-citizens (Commission of the European Communities 1990a). 
7 The term `collective identity´ is defined very varyingly. I understand it as an emotional 
feeling or consciousness of individuals of belonging to a certain collective unity or social `life-
community´, which is characterised distinctively by specific features – like culture, language, 
history, possibly also religion and race – and therefore distinguishes itself from other 
collectives (Hillmann 1994: 422). It is important that the individual is chosen as a starting-
point. Additionally, the multidimensionality of the term (next to conscious perceptions of 
contingencies we find `naturally understood´ aspects like ethnos) and its flexibility (not all 
elements have to occur at the same time or equally) are relevant. 
8 In 1990 62% of the Czechoslovaks, 67% of the Hungarians and 77% of the Poles expressed 
their distrust of Russia (Commission of the European Communities 1990b). In February 2002 
nearly 60% of the interviewed Poles answered `yes´ and only about 20% `no´ to the question 
„Will Russia in the next future (5 to 10 years) try to regain influence in our part of Europe or 
not?“ (CBOS 2002a). 
9 Today, on average only 52% of East Central Europeans view the Union positively, 18% have a 
negative picture. Nearly one half worries about the integration of the EU (45% in the Czech 
Republic, 40% in Poland, 39% in Hungary) (Commission of the European Communities 2002b). 
A similar picture can be observed in Eastern Germany: in 1998 60% of the Eastern Germans 
(and 33% of the Western Germans), expressed that there was reason for being disappointed 
because of the course of the unification (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2002: 499). 
10 In the East  wages at the end of  2001 were on average 91,5% of the Western ones. The 
difference is even bigger if additional benefits and differing working hours (plus 1.7 hours in 
the East) are considered as well (Ministry for Labour and Social Order 2001). At the same time  
87% of the East Germans claim equality in wages (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2002: 504).   
11 This will continue for 7 years: 5 years as a fixed period and afterwards another two years of 
interim solution. 
12 The EU refuses direct payments of the amount of old member-states for new member-
states.  Instead, in 2004 the payments start on a level of 25% and shall become equal in 2013 
(arguments can be found in: Commission of the European Communities 2002a). 
13 The question, if the West should show more readiness to sacrifice, in 1998 was affirmed by 
only 29.4% of the West-Germans (East-Germans: 67.7%), in 1991, however, it still was 51.1% of 
the interviewed persons. In the East, on the other hand, the approval to the opinion, that the 
East has to be more patient, decreased rapidly: while in 1994 57.8% of the East-Germans 
agreed, in 1998 it was only 39.1% (West-Germans: 87.2%) (Allbus 1998). Asked if they have the 
impression that the West-Germans want to contribute to the development of Eastern 
Germany, in 2000 47% of the East-Germans disagreed (21% ‚yes’) (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 
2002: 502). 
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 14 In 2002 57% of East-Germans felt like ‚second class-citizens’ (36% did not) (Noelle-Neumann 
2002: 521). All in all, the huge discrepancy between the answers to the numerous questions 
show a considerably different perception in the East and the West. Also, in 2000 only 51% of 
the East-Germans believed that the integration will be successful (61% of the West-Germans) 
(Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2002: 497). 59% of the East-Germans in 2000 thought that 
differences and 13% stated that common features with the West predominate (West: 28% 
common features, 35% differences) (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2002: 522).    
15 Therefore, political forms of `desired deviance´ are observable, for example the relatively 
important position of the socialist (formerly communist) party in the Eastern parts of 
Germany. Their inclusion in regional governments is seen positively by only 19% of the West-
Germans, compared to 47% of the East-Germans (Allensbach 2002). 
16 Significantly less East-Germans mentioned institutions when asked about what they felt 
pride in their country. In 1996 52.9% of the West-Germans cited the Basic Law compared to 
24.1% of the East-Germans (Allbus 1998). Also, in 2000 61% of the West-Germans believed that 
the problems of the country can be solved with democracy, while only 33% of the East-
Germans did so (Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2000). 
17 This applies as a principle but with no doubt the degree of exclusion is important.  
18 `Obstinate´ is a translation of the German word `eigensinnig´. Literally this means `with 
its/one´s own sense´. 
19 This is proved by attitudes concerning the statement “What is to become of the people in 
East-Germany fundamentally depends on what they are ready to achieve“ (in 1998 West: 
78.9%, East: 34.7%) (Allbus 1998, see footnote 13). 
20 One sign is the Western German tendency to perceive more `normalization´ and `mutual 
assimilation´ on the one hand and much less differences on the other compared to the East 
(e.g. Noelle-Neumann/Köcher 2002: 523).  
21 In 2000 in the West only 24% saw themselves as `West-Germans´ and 70% as `Germans´, 
while in the East 53% perceived themselves primarily as `East-Germans´ (compared to 41% 
`Germans´) (Noelle-Neumann 2002: 525).  
22 This work was oriented toward the political ideas of the Enlightenment. The constitution 
delegated the ‘sovereignty of the nation’ to the parliament. The parliament was transformed 
to a strong and united agency of legislation by laying down the principle of majority. 
Consequently it followed the principle of separation of powers and trusted the government 
with the executive power. This government was responsible towards the parliament. Hence a 
written constitutional law has been created which was placed over singular influences. This 
has to be named ‚modern‘. But simultaneously the principle of the corporative state has not 
been touched. The political nation, that appeared as the holder of sovereignty, was not the 
complete people but the traditional ‚nobility-nation‘. This instead consisted of a few rich 
magnate‘s families and an exceedingly numerous ‚middle‘- and ‚small-nobility‘. The ‘nobility-
nation’ nevertheless claimed for itself to have realised the modern, founding on principles of 
‚natural-right’ constitution with peoples’ sovereignty and national freedom (Stollberg-Rilinger 
2000: 244f.). 
23 This ethos was able to support the communication with other suppressed peoples (but it 
didn’t necessarily do so). Examples for this are in the 19th century internationalism of the 
independence movements as well as a specific Polish ‘messianism’, which plead for the 
struggle ‘for your and for our freedom’ (Holzer 1991: 394). 
24 Obviously, in the context of religion as well as ideology of the Enlightenment the bond with 
(Western) Europe historically quite constantly has been connected with a certain mysticism, 
which supported the idea of a ‘quasi-natural unity’. 
25 In 1772, Prussia, Austria and Russia were dividing parts of Poland among themselves. In 
1791 Prussia and Russia did the same, 1795 Prussia and Austria, whereby as a consequence of 
the last division Poland disappeared completely off the map. 
26This turn is interpreted by several East Central European authors primarily as an externally 
dominated aspect. Krasnodebski for example writes: “The Poles have been increasingly 
considered a big ethnic group without the right of political sovereignty. They changed from 
being a nation to being an ethny – though this was on no account a self-chosen way” 
(Krasnodebski 1995, 246, translated quotation). Such a judgement of the history, however, 
implies the risk of overly extensive externalisation of responsibility for structural changes – 
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with a potentially problematic impact on the present-day situation. But: Under such 
circumstances an exclusive self-definition is certainly more probable, but not inevitable. 
27 Indeed, Poland achieved national sovereignty in 1918, but it didn‘t subsist in a democratic 
form until the marching in of the Nazi-Germans in 1939. In 1926 Józef Piłsudski with the 
support of the military triggered a coup d‘état, established an only seemingly democratic, 
authoritarian regime and governed as a dictator until his death in 1935. 
28 This is one of the most problematic arenas within the EU – also independently of the 
enlargement. 
29 In accordance Polish farmers judge the relations with the EU most critically: 79% believe 
that mostly the EU has had advantages so far. 82% of them expect future disadvantages of the 
integration (CBOS 2002c: 5ff.). 56% of the Poles (and 86% of the Polish farmers) agreed that 
the country should insist on the whole amount of agrarian subventions, even if the 
negotiations would fail and Poland would have to remain outside the EU (CBOS 2002b). 
30 This certainly is also a well-known feeling of Western populations in this context. 
31 Additionally this meets a certain disillusionment on the side of the West: “The initial 
euphoria in the East of Europe changed to rage and anxiety, in the centre to frustration and in 
the West to nervosity and impatience“ (Glotz 1992, 51, translated quotation). 
32 A famous Polish intellectual (with Solidarnosc-roots), Adam Michnik, stated, “that the term 
‘European‘ in Poland sounds more and more like an invective and is used in political debates 
as a synonym for ‘cosmopolitan who despises his own nation‘ (cited after Krasnodebski 1993: 
267, translated quotation). 
33 Related to this question Srubar mentions „the fear of the East Central European countries 
that under these conditions they might become a periphery of the EU (…) – perhaps because 
of their growing dependence on the compensation-payments they could find themselves in 
the role of receivers of social security at the edge of the Union“ (Srubar 1995: 684, translated 
quotation). 
34 Mildenberger states that the topic of Europe in politics „at the latest since the elections in 
September 2001 (…) became subject of a polarized and polemic debate between 
government and opposition, but also within the Polish society“ (Mildenberger 2002: 6, 
translated quotation). 
35 But also in Hungary and the Czech Republic such comments get louder. Vaclav Klaus 
published on his homepage (9.5.2001, www.klaus.cz) the following: “As a citizen of a non-
member state of the EU I have to accept that – unfortunately – membership respectively non-
membership became a factor of differentiation that shows, which country is a normal, 
according to the standard (or standardised), adult, obedient country and which one isn‘t.  (…) 
For this reason we have no other choice but endeavouring ourselves with maximal intensity 
to a possibly fast membership – and that notwithstanding our attitudes toward the present-
day model of European unification and its hidden ideology. (…) However, I‘m convinced that 
the member states are interested in keeping the status quo as long as possible. Let‘s disregard 
rhetorics, the non-member states for them are fully accessible and they have the full 
possibility to realise their comparative advantages in a one-sided and for them painless way”. 
36 At this point, the problematic combination of political and economic aspects becomes 
evident, because in the context of the accessions a close correlation between some loss of 
sovereignty and material compensation exists: „the EU is already sold to the Central European 
public (…) as an exchange in which dissolving sovereignties and clear subordination to the 
center are compensated with invitations to a cash window in Brussels“ (Tamás 2001: 6).  
37 Strobel writes further: “Andrzej Lepper, chairman of the self-help-organisation‚ 
Samoobrona‘ (i.e. self-defence, A.S.K.), that is popular among peasants, called the EU 
plastically and deterrently a ‘new kolkhos’. The differences to the status quo ante were only 
that the former one had his place of residence in Moscow, whereas the current one were 
directed from Brussels“ (Strobel 2001: 278, translated quotation). 
38 This corresponds with results from the whole East Central European region: 45% in the 
Czech Republic, 40% in Poland and 39% in Hungary worry about the EU-Integration in general 
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